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Theme: The pre-emptive element has become an important part of the UK’s national 
counter-terrorism strategy. 
 
 
Summary: The UK domestic counter-terrorism operations in August and September 
2006, against a suspected Islamist terrorist plot to bomb transatlantic airliners and against 
suspected terrorist training activities, are important examples of the pre-emptive element 
of the UK’s national counter-terrorism strategy. This resource-intensive strategy, in terms 
of the demands it makes on the intelligence services and the police, places great 
emphasis on maximising public protection by early intervention action. The alleged airliner 
bomb plot is believed to have been based upon the use of the easily obtained, though 
volatile when mixed, components for peroxide-based explosives. Such explosives pose 
major challenges to airline transport security arrangements, with the need to balance 
more intensive screening processes with the necessity to process passengers as rapidly 
as possible. The terrorist training case offers further potential evidence of the need for 
Western Europe to be alert to the domestic element within current Islamist terrorist 
activities. Finally, the analysis illustrates the utility of recent UK terrorism law changes in 
the Terrorism Act 2006, such as a longer pre-charge detention period. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
Introduction 
The general background to the UK response to 9/11 and, in particular, the response to the 
London bombings of July 2005, has been discussed in two previous ARIs.1 The purpose 
of this paper is to offer a preliminary analysis of two high-profile, intelligence-led, anti-
terrorist operations carried out in August and September 2006. The first, Operation 
‘Overt’, carried out in early August, was a pre-emptive operation against a suspected plot 
to place bombs on trans-Atlantic airliners. The potential seriousness of the situation was 
signalled by the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raising the UK alert state to 
the highest level ‘critical’ between 10-13 August and then reducing the alert state down by 
one level to ‘severe’ on 14 August.2 The second operation, carried out in early September 
was targeted against suspected training or other acts preparatory to terrorism by a 
different group of suspects. Because of the ongoing judicial processes this paper has to 
be understood as commenting on publicly available information relating to the, as yet, un-
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tested in court, grounds for the pre-emptive actions taken by the police on the basis of 
intelligence from the security and intelligence services. In some cases it is not expected 
that court proceedings will commence until 2008. 
 
In this paper three particular issues will be considered. First, the return to a higher-profile 
of the potential threat from terrorist actions against air-travel; secondly, the growing 
awareness of the problem of the radicalisation of one’s own nationals and the linkage with 
the availability of various types of training for carrying out acts of terrorism; thirdly, these 
operations saw the first use of new legislative powers contained in the Terrorism Act 2006 
which extended, under judicial supervision, pre-charge detention periods from 14 days to 
28 days and created the new offence [S.5] of committing acts preparatory to terrorism. A 
concern expressed by civil liberties groups was that prolonged detention was an 
unnecessary deprivation of liberty and might give rise to oppressive interrogation. 
However, the police argument for extended detention powers was based mostly upon the 
time needed to gather court standard evidence from such time-consuming sources as 
computers and foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, research by the Metropolitan Police showed 
that ‘... in Anti-Terrorist Branch cases well over 60% of people detained do chose to 
exercise their right to silence...’ and ‘... only one in 10 of those who would be considered 
to be leaders or directors of terrorism chose to speak’.3
 
Some sense of the UK concern can be gauged from the following comments. Referring to 
the suspected plot against airliners the Home Secretary, John Reid, said that the scale of 
the alleged plot was potentially bigger than 9/11 and that ‘Had this plot been carried out, 
the loss of life to innocent civilians would have been on an unprecedented scale’.4 Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott commented , with awareness of the concerns in UK Muslim 
communities that they were being ‘picked-on’ in anti-terrorism operations, that ‘This is not 
about communities: it is about criminals, murderers, people who want to commit mass 
murder. This is about people who might masquerade in the community, hiding behind 
faiths, but who want to commit acts no right-minded person would want to applaud.’5 
Naturally the US also had major concerns as the plot was suspected of targeting 
commercial aircraft flying from the UK to the US. In a briefing on 10 August the US DHS 
Secretary, Michael Chertoff, said of the alleged plot: ‘... it was sophisticated, it had a lot of 
members and it was international in scope. This operation is in some respects suggestive 
of an al-Qaida plot...’6 A similar suggestion is also reported to have been made by a 
Pakistani security official and by what The Times called ‘... senior British and US 
sources...7
 
Transatlantic Aircraft Bomb Plot 
The actions of the UK counter-terrorism agencies in respect of this suspected plot are fully 
consistent with the UK counter-terrorism strategy’s emphasis on intelligence-led pre-
emptive action, whenever possible, to try and prevent terrorist attacks. This strategy 
component seeks to try and use intensive surveillance operations as a means of risk 
management. It is reflected in the Government’s ‘Contest’ counter-terrorism strategy (also 
known as the ‘4Ps’) by the strand of Pursuit which aims to use intelligence effectively to 
disrupt and apprehend suspected terrorists and under which the UK has increased joint 
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working and intelligence sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies 
across the world.8 Operation ‘Overt’ had started in December 2005 and on 10 August 
2006 the National Coordinator for Terrorist Investigations (NCTI), Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner (DAC) Peter Clarke of the Metropolitan Police revealed that ‘Last night’ (9 
August) ‘the investigation reached a critical point when the decision was reached to take 
urgent action to disrupt what we believed was being planned’. Air industry security officials 
were given that information at the same time and the police began the series of arrests 
and searches in London, Birmingham and High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire.9
 
According to US DHS Secretary Chertoff it had only became evident, by the end of 
July/early August, that the UK Operation ‘Overt’ was revealing that some surveillance 
targets’ planning ‘… was taking the direction of targeting the United States...’ (and on) ‘... 
specific routes between Britain and the United States, and which are US-flagged 
carriers…’.10 Published sources differ in the number of aircraft thought to have been 
targets, with suggestions ranging from three to 12 and another suggestion that the plot 
aimed to carry out a series of three plane attacks.11 British official sources have 
suggested that reports of over 10 aircraft targeted are rather an exaggeration. Clearly 
flights to the US from the UK’s two main international terminals, Heathrow and Gatwick, 
must have been prime targets. Among the carriers that have been suggested as targets 
are American Airlines, British Airways and United Airlines. 
 
The alleged attack plot is generally suspected to have involved planning to use peroxide-
based explosives in some liquid form together with detonation devices. The components, 
it was believed, would be smuggled onto aircraft disguised as drinks or some other 
seemingly harmless material. Hence the immediate UK and US ban on carrying any forms 
of liquid in cabin hand-luggage. The UK police believe that their raids provided some 
prima facie support to their concerns. DAC Peter Clarke said ‘... since 10 August we have 
found bomb making equipment. There are chemicals including hydrogen peroxide [and] 
electrical components..’.12 According to US DHS Secretary Chertoff, the alleged UK 
plotters had ‘... accumulated and assembled the capabilities that they needed and they 
were in the final stages of planning before execution’.13
 
Peroxide-based explosives were also the bomb materials for the two London attacks of 7 
and 21 July 2005. The two most common formulae for these explosives are TATP and 
HMTD. Other liquid-based explosives have been used in attacks on aircraft in the past. A 
nitroglycerin bomb in a contact lenses case was used to blow up a Philippines Airlines 
Manila to Tokyo flight on 11 December 1994. A similar method is believed to have been 
planned for use in the ‘Bojinka’ plot of 1995 which aimed to bring down 11 aircraft over the 
Pacific.14
 
Creating security barriers against liquid explosives is a considerable challenge for air 
transport security authorities in respect of passengers and cabin-luggage. Whilst baggage 
destined for the holds can be passed through a number of check processes relatively 
swiftly it is clearly much more difficult to provide similar procedures for passengers and 
                                                 
8 HM Government, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, Cm. 6888, The 
Stationery Office, July 2006. 
9 Stewart Tendler, op. cit. 
10 ‘Homeland Security Briefing on UK Terror Arrests’, op. cit. 
11 See, for example, US News, ‘Terror Suspects Planned to Use Liquid Explosives to Blow Up Planes’, 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060810/10london.htm, accessed 10/VIII/2006, and ‘A Plot to 
Commit Murder on an Unimaginable Scale’, The Guardian, 10/VIII/2006, accessed 10/VIII/2006. 
12 Metropolitan Police, ‘Terrorism Charges’, Bulletin, 0000000474, 21/VIII/2006. 
13 ‘Homeland Security Briefing on UK Terror Arrests’, op. cit. 
 3
14 See A. Lechner, ‘Gunpowder, Treason and Plot’, The Journal of International Security-Intersec, vol. 16 (5), 
September 2006, p. 26-28, and Stewart Tendler, op. cit., quoting Peter Neumann, Director of the Centre for 
Defence Studies, King’s College, London. 
Area: International Terrorism - ARI 106/2006 
Date: 9/10/2006 
cabin luggage without excessive delays. Moreover the current technologies cannot easily 
distinguish between harmless and potentially dangerous liquids. Detector machines can 
also cause delays through generating ‘false-positive’ alarms that all require investigation. 
In a confidential test, carried out between October 2005 and January 200615 and noted by 
the US General Accountability Office, that was ‘... to determine how vulnerable US airlines 
are to suicide attacks using cheap, readily available materials. All 21 of the airports tested 
failed. Despite some of the investigators’ carry-on baggage being swabbed for chemical 
testing, all of the bomb materials made it to the passenger cabins.’16
 
An immediate consequence of the actions against the suspected plot was the imposition 
by both the UK and US of stringent controls on passengers’ cabin luggage in terms of bag 
size, a ban on all liquids except for verifiable essential medicines and baby milk and food 
which has to be tested by the passenger in front of security staff. As Secretary Chertoff 
put it: ‘We are taking the step of preventing liquids from getting into the cabin to give us 
time to make adjustments in our current screening tactics, based upon what we learn from 
this investigation concerning the nature of the devices that these individuals were 
constructing’.17 An informal EU JHA Ministerial Meeting also emphasised the need ‘... for 
research into explosives especially targeted at work on liquid explosives’.18 The 
immediate consequences for air-travel was a level of disruption that, unless there was to 
be an on-going ‘critical’ alert state, was unsustainable in the longer-term because of the 
cost to normal economic activities. For example, on 13 August, 30% of flights out of 
Heathrow were cancelled to ease pressures on the security check processes and the cost 
to the airlines of the first day’s delays was estimated at £175 million. However, from 22 
September the UK transport security authority, TRANSEC, is permitting passengers to 
take larger cabin bags as well as handbags into the cabin but the liquids ban remains in 
force.19 Furthermore, from early November passengers will be allowed to take small 
bottles of liquid, pastes and gels into aircraft under an agreement of 27 September by the 
European Commission’s Regulatory Committee for Civil Aviation Security which will give 
uniform hand-luggage rules in all EU states.20
 
The Suspect Plotters 
A key concern of the UK and other EU states is to understand and seek to counter the 
ways in which an individual may be radicalised and then recruited into terrorism.21 The UK 
Communities Minister, Phil Woolas, is quoted as saying it would take ‘generations’ to 
overcome extremists who wanted to destroy society.22 In this context the suspects’ 
backgrounds are being minutely scrutinised for common points or patterns of behaviour. 
All of those arrested in the UK in August were British citizens, with many having Pakistani 
ethnic origins. Indeed there is believed to be some evidence which links the alleged UK 
plotters to extremists in Pakistan and the Pakistani authorities have arrested two Britons 
among a group of arrests in Karachi and Lahore in early August 2006. One of the two, 
Rashid Rauf is a brother of a person arrested in the UK. The UK police made about 25 
arrests on or around 10 August but five of those arrested were later released without 
charge. Eight of those arrested, Ahmed Abdullah Ali, Tanvir Hussain, Umar Islam, Arafat 
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Waheed Khan, Assad ali Sarwar, Adam Khatib, Ibrahim Savant and Waheed Zaman were 
each charged on 22 August with conspiracy to murder contrary to the Criminal Law Act 
1997 and preparing acts of terrorism contrary to the Terrorism Act 2006 [S.5]. They mostly 
gave London addresses and their ages ranged from 19 to 28. 
 
At the same time an un-named 17 year old male was charged with possession of articles 
useful to a person preparing to commit acts of terrorism contrary to the Terrorism Act 
2000. Cossar Ali, who is married to Ahmed Abdullah Ali, and Mehran Khan were both 
charged with failing to disclose information that might be of ‘material assistance’ in 
preventing the commission of a terrorist act contrary to the Terrorism Act 2000.23 Eleven 
other suspects then remained in custody, including Tayib Rauf the brother of Rashid Rauf 
who was arrested in Pakistan. Commenting on the remaining 11 suspects, Susan 
Hemmings, Head of the Crown Prosecution Service’s Counter-Terrorism Division, said 
‘We have been carefully examining and assessing the evidence against each individual 
with the assistance of anti-terrorist officers in order to come to charging decisions as early 
as possible’.24 Although controversial, in civil liberties terms, the police are clearly making 
full use of the evidence-gathering opportunities under the extended pre-charge detention 
period, up to 28 days, provided under the new Terrorism Act 2006. 
 
Because of perceptions, from within Muslim communities, that the police were arresting 
people without any real evidence, the authorities have given rather unprecedented details 
of the types of evidence they believe they will be able to present in court. DAC Peter 
Clarke referred to surveillance evidence including video and audio recordings obtained 
before 10 August, bomb-making equipment and martyrdom video recordings. There were 
searches of 69 sites: houses, flats, businesses, vehicles and open spaces. Among the 
other potential sources of evidence seized are 400 computers, 200 mobile telephones and 
8,000 items of removable storage media such as memory sticks and CDs. DAC Clarke 
said ‘So far, from the computers alone, we have removed some 6,000 gigabytes of 
data’.25
 
This material will necessitate many months of work by forensic computer analysts and is 
one reason why trials are not expected to open until perhaps 2008. A linked matter that is 
still under discussion in the UK is the question of the use of intercept evidence in court. At 
present such evidence is not used, partly to protect sources and intelligence gathering 
methods and, partly, because it would be a resource-intensive task, under disclosure to 
the defence rules, to make available large volumes of transcript material. However, the 
Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith QC, is quoted as saying that such evidence would be a 
‘key tool in the fight against terrorism’ and Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair 
has stated that ‘My personal professional view is that we should be moving to the use of 
intercept evidence in court’.26
 
Terrorist Training 
During the investigations into the 7 July London bombings there were suggestions that 
some of the dead bombers might have undergone some form of ‘training’ in the UK and 
that possibility, alongside the evidence that some of those involved in the UK in the 
current cycle of terrorism received training in the Pakistan region, has meant that 
disruption of potential training is an important element in the UK’s counter-terrorism 
strategy. In that context an operation in early September 2006 is of general importance, 
although unconnected with either the July 2005 London bombings or the 2006 airliners 
plot: 14 men were arrested in London, under the Terrorism Act 2000, after what the BBC 
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correspondent Keith Doyle described as ‘months of surveillance into those suspected of 
recruiting or encouraging others to take part in terrorist activities’.27 Searches also took 
place at a large property near Crowborough in East Sussex owned by Jameah Islameah 
as a boys teaching facility and at several houses in London. The BBC security 
correspondent Gordon Corera said the arrests were linked to allegations concerning the 
existence of training camps in the UK for those who wished to undertake terrorist acts.28 
The men arrested were aged between17 and 48 and many are thought to be British 
Muslims of Pakistani origin. A Metropolitan Police spokesman is quoted as saying that 
‘The arrests in south and east London follow many months of surveillance and 
investigation in a joint operation involving the Anti-Terrorist Branch, Special Branch and 
the Security Service’.29
 
In this operation there has been quite a swift move to the post arrest charging stage. On 
11 September four men, aged between 22 and 47 were charged with offences under the 
Terrorism Act 2000: Yassin Mutegombwa was charged with three counts of receiving 
terrorist training in the use of weapons at locations in Hampshire and Berkshire and his 
brother, Hassan Mutegombwa, was charged with procuring funds for terrorism. Musa 
Akmet and Mustafa Abdullah were charged with having information useful to a person 
committing an act of terrorism and Akmet was also charged with illegal possession of a 
firearm contrary to the Firearms Act 1968.30
 
On 13 September a further six men, aged between17 and 42, were charged with a range 
of offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 and other Acts. The following are a sample of 
the alleged offences. Mohammad Al-Figari was charged with offences connected to 
terrorist training contrary to S.6 or S.54 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of being concerned 
with acts preparatory to terrorism contrary to S.6 and S.2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Attila 
Ahmet was charged with, among other offences, soliciting or encouraging persons to 
commit murder of those who were not Muslims contrary to S.4 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861. Kadar Ahmed and a 17-year old were charged with offences connected 
to terrorist training contrary to S.6 or S.54 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Ahmed was also 
charged with possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing an act of 
terrorism contrary to S.58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Moussa Brown was charged with 
providing instruction or training in the making or use of firearms contrary to S.54 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Saloum Joh was charged with possession of a prohibited firearm 
contrary toS.5 of the Firearms Act 1968.31
 
On 14 September two further men were charged in connection with the anti-terrorist 
operation on 1-2 September. Mohamed Hamid (aged 48) was charged with, among other 
offences, soliciting or encouraging persons to murder people who do not ‘implement 
Allah’s law’ contrary to S.4 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 and publishing a 
statement intending members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or 
otherwise induced by the statement to commit or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences contrary to S1 (20) of the Terrorism Act 2006. Kibley Da Costa (aged 23) was 
charged with, among other offences, providing instruction or training in the use of any 
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method or technique for doing anything that is capable of being done for the purposes of 
terrorism contrary to S.6 (1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.32
 
It is clear from the details of the charges that their does exist prima facie evidence that is 
sufficient for court proceedings against a number of individuals, which reflects the general 
concerns that the UK counter-terrorism agencies have about what they believe to be the 
range of activities associated with potential Islamist terrorism incidents in the UK or 
originating in the UK. However, a crucial question that arises, in connection with both the 
alleged airliner bomb plot and the alleged activities relating to fostering terrorism and 
terrorist training, is whether the evidence available at the time of pre-emption and 
subsequently gathered will convince a jury. The outcomes of the ‘ricin case’ illustrate this 
‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ evidential issue. 
 
In what may be termed a high profile CBRN-linked new terror threat case, the ‘ricin case’ 
was concluded in April 2005 though with only one suspect, Kamal Bourgass, being 
convicted and sentenced to 17 years imprisonment for conspiracy to cause a public 
nuisance by the use of poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury. 
Bourgass was already in prison on a life sentence for the murder of DC Oake in 
Manchester in 2003. Four other defendants were cleared of conspiracy charges and a 
second related trial was abandoned. Some of these suspects were later detained on 
national security grounds. Commenting on the trial outcomes, an Anti-terrorist Branch 
Briefing Note said that if there had been an opportunity for a longer pre-charge 
investigative process then ‘The quality of the original charging decisions would also have 
been higher, and it is probable that the suspect who fled the country while on bail and who 
eventually proved to have been a prime conspirator, would have stood trial in this country. 
If that had happened, the outcome of the trial process might have been very different.’33 In 
his overall assessment DAC Peter Clarke, said a ‘real and deadly threat’ was prevented.34
 
Conclusions: Taking the last point in the previous section first, the Terrorism Act 2006 
has provided for just such a longer pre-charge investigative process and its provisions 
have clearly been used in relation to some of those charged in connection with the 
suspected airliner plot. However, the powers do not seem to have been required for those 
charged with terrorist training offences. In both cases the new Terrorism Act 2006 offence 
of carrying out acts preparatory to terrorism has been used in the charging process. This 
offence was controversial during the legislative stages as civil liberties lobbies suggested 
it could be open to too wide an interpretation. 
 
The arrests do also seem to illustrate the concerns that the UK counter-terrorism agencies 
have about the scale and scope of Islamist terrorism related activity in the UK. In 
September 2005 the Home Secretary referred to ‘hundreds of individuals who we have 
been watching very closely and continue to watch closely’.35 Within this number there 
would be individuals within the ‘essential’ and ‘desirable’ investigative categories, in terms 
of counter-terrorism resource allocation.36 Some of whom are likely to have featured in the 
recent arrests, as detailed earlier. Additionally, the UK has increasing knowledge of 
numbers of ‘peripherals’ who might carry out a range of supportive activities or who might 
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move from merely being facilitators to potential attackers. DAC Clarke commented that ‘in 
terms of broad descriptions of the numbers of people who we have to be interested in, we 
are into the thousands’.37 However, it is important for that comment, which was widely 
reported, to be understood as not referring to thousands of terrorist activists in the UK but, 
as DAC Clarke actually clarified the comment, the number refers to those who might be 
involved in a very wide spectrum of activities that might be linked to terrorism. 
 
Such activities are set out in the various charges brought against suspects in these two 
operations. Among the recent group of suspects charged it is also noticeable that the age 
bracket now runs from about 17 into the 40s, whereas in previous cases the upper age 
group was in their 30s. This apparently increasing number of ‘peripherals’ has been 
recognized for several years.38 However, after the July 2005 London bombings the 
government has tried to engage more closely with Muslim communities in order to counter 
terrorism directed radicalisation.39 The imperative for closer engagement has been clearly 
supported by the comments in the declassified portions of the April 2006 US ‘National 
Intelligence Estimate’ (NIE). The NIE contends that ‘The jihadists regard Europe as an 
important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive 
Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks’.40
 
At present the Muslim groups that were consulted during the July-September period in 
2005 do not feel that any very visible Government responses have been delivered and are 
concerned about the impact, on Muslim communities, of events such as the abortive 
large-scale police search for a possible chemical weapon, in which one person was 
injured by a shot from a police firearm, in Forest Gate in London in June 2006. In that 
context, there are proposals to give confidential pre-operation briefings to special security-
cleared Muslim community figures which may serve to better manage community 
tensions. However, when the Home Secretary John Reid tried to suggest that Muslim 
parents, at an East London meeting on 20 September, should look out for radicalisation 
signs in their children’s behaviour, he found himself addressing what the Home Office 
called ‘a sometimes heated meeting’.41 This was despite the fact that the Home Secretary 
tried to suggest that all British citizens shared ‘principles of devotion to family and society, 
to faith and to good deeds… the values of Britain’.42
 
Finally, the preventive security work relating to air transport and airports will remain a 
continuing challenge in respect of balancing the need for security ‘barriers’ and running a 
commercially viable intensively used modern transport medium. New detector technology, 
specially trained ‘sniffer’ dogs and enhanced on-board security measures all have their 
part to play. As Secretary Chertoff said, ‘I would rather have more protection and then 
scale it back as we become more reassured than underestimate the problem and find out 
... that we’ve made a tragic mistake’.43
 
Frank Gregory 
Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton 
 
                                                 
37 Reuters, ‘UK Police Say Suspected Thousands of Terrorism Links’, quoting BBC interview with DAC Clarke, 
1/IX/2006, http://www.alertnet.org/news/newsdesk/L01103315.htm, accessed 25/IX/2006. 
38 Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Annual Report 2004-2005’, Cm. 6510, para. 23, p. 12, April 2005. 
39 This is also a general EU priority, see: Finland’s EU Presidency, op. cit. 
40 ‘Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism’, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/world/middleeast/27itext.html, accessed 28/IX/2006. 
41 Home Office, ‘Home Secretary Calls for Unity in Meeting with Muslim group’, 20/IX/2006, 
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42 Ibid. 
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